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VALIULLA IAKUPOV’S
TATAR ISLAMIC TRADITIONALISM
Alfrid K. Bustanov and Michael Kemper, University of Amsterdam
Abstract  
In this article we analyze the concept of “traditional Islam” in the writings of the Tatar scholar 
Valiulla Iakupov (1963–2012). We discuss Iakupov’s interpretation of the history of Tatar Islam, 
his views on “Wahhabism” (which he condemned in strongest terms), and on state-Islam relations 
in contemporary Russia, as well as his ideas about the relation between Islamic authority and 
secular science. Against the background of this content analysis, we then proceed to analyze 
Iakupov’s religious language, especially his use of Arabic-origin loanwords and their Russian 
equivalents of Church Slavonic origin, and also his creative coinage of new religious terms. While 
Iakupov was above all known as a proponent of the use of Tatar as Russia’s major language for 
Islam, we argue that Iakupov also made a significant contribution to the development of “Islamo-
Russian” as the new religious idiom of Muslims in the Russian-speaking world. 
1. Introduction
This paper discusses life and work of the prominent Tatar theologian Valiulla 
Iakupov (1963–2012), a person whom many saw as the “grey eminence” in the 
Tatarstan Muftiate. Iakupov was a staunch opponent of what is in Russia often 
subsumed under the term “Wahhabism”, that is, of all Salafi trends in Islam 
which are critical of the theological, legal and Sufi “traditional” schools and 
brotherhoods in the country, and which are believed to have been “imported” 
from the Arab World, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Against these and other 
“foreign” trends, Iakupov propagated, and developed, the so-called “traditional” 
Tatar theological tradition.  
Iakupov’s personality and his enormous output of Islamic literature are still 
awaiting a comprehensive scholarly analysis. What we attempt to achieve in this 
article is to discuss Iakupov’s role in the post-Soviet revival of Islam in Tatar-
stan, his basic concepts of Islamic “traditionalism”, and especially his personal 
“style” of exposition, that is, how he expressed Islamic contents in the post-
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Soviet discourse on Islam, in the Russian language.1 This contribution is part of 
a larger project on the emergence of a new “Russian Islamic sociolect”, a spe-
cific Russian language of Islam in the contemporary Russian Federation that 
accompanies the emergence of an all-Russian (in the sense of rossiiskii) Islamic 
discourse which transcends ethnic boundaries.2 We suggest that this sociolect 
consists of a cluster of individual “styles” of how to write about Islam in the 
Russian language, with specific repertoires of Arabic/Islamic loanwords, on the 
one hand, but also with terms that are of Church Slavonic origin, and thus 
developing in close contact with the Christian-Orthodox religious discourse in 
Russia, on the other. While Iakupov was a staunch defender of the use of Tatar 
for Islamic texts, he himself wrote several of his major works in Russian, and 
thus actively contributed to the development of “Islamic Russian”. We suggest 
that Iakupov maintained a special place in this Russian Islamic discourse 
because he drew from at least three different linguistic repertoires (which we 
refer to as “Russianism”, “Arabism”, and “Academism”) that other contem-
porary Islamic authors in Russia usually do not mix that easily. We will analyse 
these features separately and then discuss how Iakupov’s “style mix” related to 
the contents of his messages, to see how form and content reflect the publication 
strategies of the author. 
Unfortunately this paper is already an obituary: on July 19, 2012 Valiulla-
Hazrat was shot dead on the streets of Kazan by unknown assailants. On that 
same day, his superior, the Mufti of Tatarstan, Ildus Faizov, also became victim 
of a car bomb attack which he, however, survived with serious injuries. There 
are many rumours in Kazan as to why exactly Iakupov was eliminated, and who 
benefitted from his removal. At any event, the Russian authorities responded to 
the two attacks with a large-scale campaign of arrests. Several special operations 
resulted in the killing of individuals who were held responsible for the atrocious 
attacks, including a certain Amir Muhammad, leader of a self-proclaimed group 
of “Tatarstan mujahidin” connected to the so-called Caucasus Emirate (Imarat 
Kavkaz) of the Chechen underground radical Dokku Umarov, and one Robert 
Valeev, who lost his life when his apartment in Kazan was stormed by the 
1 Iakupov’s text production in the Tatar language will not be discussed here in detail. See in 
this context FRANK, Allen J.: Tatar Islamic Texts. Hyattsville: Dunwoody Press, 2008.
2 For an outline of this project, see BUSTANOV, Alfrid K. / Michael KEMPER (eds.): Islamic 
Authority and the Russian Language: Studies on Texts from European Russia, the North 
Caucasus and West Siberia. Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2012.
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police.3 Faizov has in the meantime been replaced by a very young Mufti, Kamil 
Samigullin, who tries to navigate between the various factions.4 
2. Iakupov’s Religious and Academic Career 
Valiulla Makhmutovich Iakupov (b. 1963 in a village of Ufa region, Bashkorto-
stan) started his career as a secular scientist: his first degree (from the Kirov-
Institute in Kazan, 1987) was in chemical engineering. He then got involved in 
the Tatar national movement,5 and became a leading activist in its Islamic wing. 
Already in 1990, he established Iman, which soon became the most popular 
Islamic publishing house in Tatarstan and perhaps in the whole of the Russian 
Federation. In 1992, he was appointed imam of the Apanaev mosque in the Old 
Tatar neighbourhood of Kazan, a position that he held until the end of his life; in 
the same year, Iakupov started an Islamic newspaper by the same name of Iman, 
in the Tatar language, and initially even in Arabic script. From 1993 to 1996, he 
also served as rector of the recently re-established Muhammadiyya madrasa in 
Kazan; however, in those early years, the madrasa was still struggling for the 
return of the historical Muhammadiyya building, and classes (largely held by 
Arab teachers sent by the Tayba Foundation, with instruction given in Arabic 
3   On 4 August 2012, Amir Muhammad and his “Tatarstan Mujahidin” released a video in 
which they “renewed” their bay‘a to Dokku Umarov; on 18 October, the group posted 
another video which shows the burial of Amir Muhammad, reportedly taking place on 23 
Dhu l-Qa‘da / 9 October. See: 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boBExXsoJ74> (30 July 2013); and: 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ceXzmwpEjcQ> (last visited 14 May 2013, no longer 
online). 
For the street fight of 24 October leading to the death of Robert Valeev, whom the 
authorities identified as the actual killer of Iakupov, see: 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwp&v=PDhETIHEpEI&NR=1> (last visited 30 
July 2013). 
4  WELIEVA, Landysh: “Five Cornerstones of Kamil Samigullin’s Policy.” The Kazan Times, 
28 March 2013; see: 
<http://kazantimes.com/politics/five-cornerstones-of-kamil-samigullins-policy> (last visited 
30 July 2013). 
5  On the Tatar national movement, see BILZ, Marlies: Tatarstan in der Transformation: Natio-
naler Diskurs und Politische Praxis, 1988–1994. Stuttgart, 2007. 
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with the help of translators)6 were held at various places, including in Iakupov’s 
Apanaevskaia mosque. With his enormous energy, Iakupov was thus a veritable 
pioneer and central figure in the bottom-up re-establishment of Tatarstan’s 
Islamic infrastructure,7 not only in the fields of preaching and teaching, but also 
in Islamic publishing and journalism.  
Around 1998, the self-made man Iakupov became an Islamic official: he 
accepted the position of deputy Mufti of Tatarstan, with a portfolio first for 
waqfs (1998–2008), then for relations to state structures, and finally for edu-
cation (2011–12). Many regarded him as the conceptual thinker behind the 
Muftiate, as the major authority in the struggle against “Salafi-Wahhabi views”, 
which, as he wrote himself, “were dominant among the clergy [of the Republic 
of Tatarstan] since the early 1990s”.8 Iakupov saw it as his task to provide the 
“Tatar clergy” with a solid foundation beyond Salafism, in the form of a national 
theological edifice that he called “Ḥanafī traditionalism” (khanafitskii traditsio-
nalizm).
It is important to note here that in the early post-Soviet years, “Islamic tra-
ditionalism” still had a rather bad image: it was usually linked to the anti-
intellectual village Islam of the Soviet period, and to the so-called Qadīmīs (the 
followers of “blind imitation”) of the late imperial age. (In part 6 below, we will 
return to the perceived opposition of “progressive Jadidism” and “reactionary 
Qadimism” in Tatar Islamic thought). Thus Iakupov’s task was to make “tradi-
tionalism” popular, and to raise it to a higher intellectual level. With “his” 
publishing house Iman in his luggage, Iakupov soon turned out to be the right 
man for bringing “traditionalism” into harmony with a professed rational ap-
proach to Islam. 
Important for this success was that next to his work as theologian, pub-
lisher, educator and religious manager, Iakupov also continued his academic 
career. According to his autobiography, he took distance learning courses in 
history at Kazan State (today: Federal) University. In 2003, he was matriculated 
6 ADYGAMOV, R.G.: “Na puti k istine i sovershenstvu.” In: Medrese “Mukhammadiia”: 
preemstvennost’ traditsii. Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi 125-letiiu 
medrese “Mukhammadiia” i 150-letiiu G. Barudi, 25 oktiabria 2007 g., otv. red. i sost. V.M. 
Iakupov. Kazan: Izdatel’stvo DUM RT, 2008, pp. 64–71.
7 USMANOVA, Dilyara / Ilnur MINNULLIN / Rafik MUKHAMETSHIN: “Islamic Education in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Tatarstan.” In: KEMPER, Michael / Raoul MOTIKA / Stefan REICH-
MUTH (eds.): Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States. London; New 
York: 2009, pp. 21–66, esp. 50–63.
8 IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Islam v Tatarstane v 1990-e gody. Kazan: Iman, 2005, p. 94.
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at the Russian Academy of Public Administration (a cadre factory in Moscow), 
and in the following year he obtained a PhD at Kazan University, with a thesis 
on the topic of state-Islam relations (in the discipline of “theory of politics/
history/methodology of political sciences”).9 A strong grounding in the academic 
tradition of Islamic studies was an important asset for Iakupov’s project. It is 
therefore no wonder that in most of his publications we find a serious scholarly 
apparatus, with references to leading academic scholars of Islam in the secular 
Oriental research centers of St. Petersburg (Stanislav M. Prozorov) and Moscow 
(Vitalii V. Naumkin, Vladimir O. Bobrovnikov, Aleksei Malashenko, Iurii D. 
Arapov, and many others).10 When asked about the relationship between the 
Islamic authorities in Tatarstan and the St. Petersburg school of classical 
Oriental Studies, Iakupov’s reply was that “for us they are just like people from 
heaven (nebozhiteli). We have no specialists of that level [in Tatarstan]”.11 This 
combination of Islamic knowledge with, as we shall see, solid Russian scholar-
ship in the Marxist and then post-Soviet academic tradition distinguished Iaku-
pov not only from most Soviet and post-Soviet Tatar imams (whose knowledge 
was often limited to conducting the ritual), but also from the younger generation 
of Islamic students who obtained their professional religious education in 
Islamic institutions abroad.  
As a self-made man between the academic and the religious and political 
fields, Iakupov underwent several subsequent self-transformations. The most 
important among these was his “conversion” from a convinced Komsomol 
functionary12 to an activist of Islam (that is, a recovering of the religion of his 
ancestors), and then to the specifically Tatar version of it. But Iakupov was also 
a characteristic product of his time in so far as he was Russian-educated and 
made a conscious effort to learn Tatar; according to the Tatar scholar of Islam 
Azat Akhunov (who knew him for many years), in the first years of his Islamic 
activities Iakupov neither spoke nor wrote Tatar. 13 From the early 1990s 
onwards he linked his engagement for Islam with an advocacy for the use of 
Tatar, and even for its “Islamization”, by returning to the Arabic script.  
9 Biographical sketch in: IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Islam segodnia. Kazan: Iman, 1432/ 2011, pp.
384–386.
10 IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Anti-islam (o raskol’nicheskoi sushchnosti vakhkhabitov-reformatorov).
Kazan: Iman, 1427/ 2006, p. 9, footnote 1; p. 23.
11 Interview with Valiulla Iakupov by Alfrid K. Bustanov, Kazan, 30 March 2011. 
12 Documents on Iakupov’s communist past are on display in the Iakupov museum that was 
recently opened in the Apanaevskaia mosque in Kazan. 
13 Interview with Azat Akhunov by Alfrid K. Bustanov, Kazan, 9 January 2013. 
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Iakupov’s transformations are also reflected in his personal appearance. On 
photographs of 1989–1991 he was still cleanly shaven, and dressed in Soviet/ 
western style; but from 1992 onwards he grew a mighty beard, and at times 
appeared in public in Islamic/Arabic dress.14 After 1998, the long “Wahhabi-
looking” beard became severely trimmed, and it also seems that Iakupov lost 
weight. What underlines the dynamic fluidity of those first post-Soviet years and 
of the “rediscovery of Islam” is that Iakupov also changed his personal name 
several times: in 1992 he signed the first number of the (Arabic-script!) news-
paper Iman with “Vinerulla Yagkup” (in Cyrillic Tatar), which, it seems, was 
back then already a self-made pen-name, seemingly derived from his original, 
non-Islamic given name Vener. Later he switched again, from Vinerulla to Vali-
ulla; whether this new name was chosen because of the Arabic meaning (“Friend 
of Allah”, with the Arabic term wali perhaps expressing sympathy for Sufi 
shaykhs) is a matter of speculation. At any event, Iakupov’s language and iden-
tity changes went hand in hand with the gradual emergence of his national / 
ethnic interpretation of Islam. 
3. The Iman Publishing House 
Iakupov’s most visible heritage in Russia is the enormous output of the pub-
lishing house that he set up in 1990 and directed since then. Iman (“Faith”) stood 
out on the Russian Islamic book market: it produced more than a thousand titles, 
in both Russian and Tatar (with slightly more Tatar than Russian titles).15 As far 
as we can judge, all of these publications were formally edited by Iakupov. The 
usual format of Iman publications was little brochures (14 x 20cm, mostly of 50 
to 100 pages), printed on cheap paper and in low technical quality. After Islamic 
literature had practically been non-existent in the late Soviet period, the little 
Iman publications made a huge contribution to the availability of basic Islamic 
knowledge. The pocket-size Iman booklets were sold for an almost symbolic 
price at makeshift religious kiosks, and sent in huge masses to many mosques in 
14  See photos in: IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Islam v Tatarstane v 1990-e gody. Kazan: Iman, 2005. 
15  For a list of publications in Tatar and Russian languages, see: “Iman” näshriyatï kitaplarï 
katalogï. Kazan: Iman, 2011). 
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Tatarstan and all over the Russian Federation, where they were distributed 
among the local Tatar population; and this format is still very popular today.16  
Iman’s first titles, in the early 1990s, comprised prayer guides, rules for the 
reading of the Quran, expositions of Islamic ethics and family life, and similar 
basic literature on the regulations of Islam, by many different authors. Iman also 
paid much attention to the “small” genres of the Tatar Islamic tradition, 
including poetic eulogies of the Prophet (Arabic munājāt; Tatar mönäjätlär) and 
invocations of Allah (du‘ā/ doga), as well as small compilations of sermons and 
prayers (including one of 1993 that included texts of Tatar abystais, that is, of 
Muslim women who in the Soviet period took on the role of religious leaders).17 
Some of the first Sufi publications in post-Soviet Tatarstan were also produced 
by Iman, in the form of a Naqshbandiyya litany of saints, the Khatm-i 
khwājagān.18 Also published were the works of the eminent Islamic authority 
Gabdulkhaq Samatov (1930–2009), the Ufa Muslim Spiritual Administration’s 
long-time qadi for Tatarstan.19 Samatov tried to uphold the continuity of the 
spiritual chain of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi brotherhood (ṭarīqa) in Tatarstan, 
against the widespread assumption that Sufism had completely disappeared in 
the Soviet era.20 Samatov seems to have been one of Iakupov’s close contacts in 
the Islamic wing of the Tatar National Movement of the early 1990s, and one of 
his teachers. 
In addition, Iman published booklets on how to read and write (reformed) 
Arabic-script “Old Tatar” (that is, the vernacular as it was written in Russia 
before the double alphabet change in the 1920s and 1930s, to Latin and then to 
Cyrillic),21 as well as Arabic language aids. These first publications were often 
translations from the Turkish or Arabic into Tatar or Russian. Equally important 
were re-editions (in Arabic script) as well as modern Tatar or Russian transla-
16  Similar popular brochures (in Tatar and Russian) are being published by Idris Galiautdin, 
imam of the Tauba mosque in Naberezhnye Chelny; these publications we found not only in 
bookshops in Tatarstan but also in Dagestan. 
17  ISXAQÏY, R.: Xaj säfäre. Dogalar. Kazan: Iman, 1993; ZAKIROVA, R.: Ärvaxlarïbïznï 
shatlandïrïyq (ille berenche könendä ütkärelüche tägziya mäjlese). Kazan: Iman, 2002. See 
the English translation of the latter item in FRANK, Tatar Islamic Texts, pp. 221–234. 
18  Xatem xuja häm doga-i xatem. Kazan: Iman, 1996, 1997. 
19  On this prominent Tatar religious figure see: Xalïk küngelendäge Gabdelxaq xäzrät. Kazan: 
Surgut, 2010; FRANK, Tatar Islamic Texts, pp. xx–xxii. 
20  SAMATOV, Gabdelxaq: Millätebezdä Islam dine. Kazan: Iman, 1998. 
21  For these alphabet changes, see BALDAUF, Ingeborg: Schriftreform und Schriftwechsel bei 
den muslimischen Russland- und Sowjettürken (1850–1937): Ein Symptom ideengeschicht-
licher und kulturpolitischer Entwicklungen. Budapest: 1993. 
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tions of pre-revolutionary Islamic works, including classics like Aḥmad Hādī
Maqṣūdī’s (d. 1941) ‘Ibādat-i islāmiyya as well as his basic reading compen-
dium Mu‘allim-i awwal (which were reprinted, as simple xeroxes or in Cyrillic 
transcription, probably already since the late 1980s). While most Iman titles 
were published in 200 copies, a few bestsellers reportedly had print runs of up to 
25.000.22 While these publications were based on pre-revolutionary prints, Iman
would later also publish Tatar or Russian translations of Tatar or Arabic works 
that had only been preserved in manuscript form, thus making a serious 
(although perhaps not always very professional) contribution to the exploration 
of Tatar Islamic literature.23
Yet the early years of post-Soviet Islamic printing were not only a period in 
which Tatar Muslims rediscovered their own Islamic heritage; they were also a 
time in which they began to explore the global market of Islam. This is reflected 
in the fact that among the early Iman publications we also find Islamic authors 
who would later be regarded as representatives of “foreign threats”. Thus Iaku-
pov published Ayatollah Khomeini and other Shii authors next to the Pakistani 
Sunni Abū l-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, as well as authors that are held in high regard by 
Salafis (like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya)24 in a line with the classical standard 
literature of the Hanafi school of law (like Aḥmad al-Qudūrī’s [d. 1037] Mukhta-
ṣar).25 In the 2000s this broad colorful spectrum was reduced to “traditional” 
titles, mostly of the Hanafi trend, and often of Tatarstani provenance. Also pub-
lished were strong anti-“Wahhabi” polemics, both of contemporary and of his-
torical authors.26
Another outstanding hallmark of Iman, right from the start, was that it also 
published Tatar and Russian academic literature on Islam and Islamic literature. 
Several well-known and highly respected historians published their works in 
22 “Iman” näshriyatï kitaplarï katalogï . Kazan: Iman, 2011.
23 Examples are UTYZ IMIANI, Abd ar-Rakhim [‘Abdarraḥīm al-Ūtiz al-Īmānī, d. 1834]:
Zhemchuzhiny raziasnenii. Dzhavakhir al’-baian [Jawāhīr al-bayān]. Transl. R. ADYGA-
MOV. Kazan: Iman, 2003; UTYZ IMIANI, Abd ar-Rakhim: Traktat o vydelke kozhi (Risalia 
dibaga) [Risāla dibīgha]. Transl. R. ADYGAMOV. Kazan: Iman, 2003; as well as hitherto 
unpublished works by Muḥammad-‘Alī Chūqrī.
24 AL’-DZHAUZIIA, Ibn Kaiiim: Prorocheskaia meditsina Islama. Chast’ pervaia. At-tybb an-
Nabavi. Kazan: Iman, 2001.
25 Iakupov himself gave an overview of the spectrum of Iman publications in his Islam 
segodnia, pp. 232–239.
26 AL-DZHAVZI, Imam Gabdurakhman Abu al-Khasan: Bor’ba s somneniiami antropomorfistov 
(Dafg shubakh at-tashbikh [Daf‘ shubah al-tashbīh]. Transl. R. ADYGAMOV. Kazan: Iman, 
2006.
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Iman, among them Damir Iskhakov (a leading intellectual of the Tatar national 
movement) and Iakh”ia Abdullin (1920–2006, a major representative of Tatar 
“Mirasism”, a concept to which we will return below), and later also other 
authors who in their scholarly and popular-academic writings contributed to the 
propagation of the Tatar Islamic heritage. These contemporary scholars – also 
including Rafik Mukhametshin, Aidar Iuzeev, and Aidar Khabudtinov – ob-
viously saw publishing with Iman as a valuable alternative to the state-run 
publishing houses in Kazan.27 The result is an intriguing contact zone between 
religion and academic life. 
4. Iakupov’s Tatar Traditional Islam
It is only from 2000 onwards that Iakupov began to produce a significant amount 
of “own” texts. Altogether, he authored at least 57 Iman publications, of which 
35 in Russian and 22 in Tatar. Next to small brochures of the format described 
above28, these titles comprised at least nine hard-cover books (including one 
edited volume). Broadly speaking, these book publications can be divided into 
two groups: documentary studies of the development of the Islamic movement 
and the religious elite in the 1990s and 2000s (with personal memories and valu-
able photographic material),29 on the one hand, and Iakupov’s own conceptual 
27 ISKHAKOV, Damir: Fenomen tatarskogo dzhadidizma: vvedenie k sotsiokul’turnomu 
osmysleniiu. Kazan: Iman, 1997; articles by Iakh”ia ABDULLIN and his colleagues from the 
“Obshchestvennaia mysl’” section of the Institute of History, Language and Literature in 
Islam v Povolzh’e: istoriia i problemy izucheniia. Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii 1989 
goda, posviashchennoi 1100-letiiu (po khidzhre) ofitsial’nogo priniatiia Islama Volzhskoi 
Bulgarii. Kazan: Iman, 2000, with Abdullin also on the editorial board; MUKHAMETSHIN,
Rafik: Islam v tatarskoi obshchestvennoi mysli nachala XX veka. Kazan: Iman, 2000; 
IUZEEV, Aidar: Tatarskaia filosofskaia mysl’ kontsa XVIII–XIX vekov. Kazan: Iman, 1996; 
KHABUTDINOV, Aidar: Millet Orenburgskogo dukhovnogo sobraniia v kontse XVIII-XIX 
vekakh. Kazan: Iman, 2000.
28 Among these brochure publications we find: IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Vakhkhabizm: ponimanie 
kornei i rolevykh modelei islamskogo ekstremizma. Kazan: Iman, 2005; IAKUPOV,
Deiatel’nost’ DUM RT v 2002 godu. Kazan: Iman, 2005; YAKUPOV, Veliulla: Hanefi 
Mezhebi, onun anlamı ve güncelligi. Kazan: Iman, 2005; IAKUPOV: Anti-islam (o 
raskol’nicheskoi sushchnosti vakhkhabito-reformatorov). Kazan: Iman, 2006.
29 IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Islam v Tatarstane v 1990-e gody. Kazan: Iman, 2005; Medrese 
“Mukhammadiia”: preemstvennost’ traditsii. Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii, posvia-
shchennoi 125-letiiu medrese “Mukhammadiia” i 150-letiiu G. Barudi, 25 oktiabria 2007 g., 
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reflections of Islam, on the other.30 According to the words of the rector of the 
Russian Islamic University in Kazan, Prof. Dr. Rafik Mukhametshin, Iakupov 
produced his publications very quickly and with much enthusiasm.31
Almost all of Iakupov’s publications since 2000 display a strong anti-
“Wahhabi” tone and reveal the search for “Tatar traditional Islam”. The attempt 
to construct a “patriotic”, “national” form of Islam is of course a broader post-
Soviet phenomenon that can also be observed in the Muslim-majority republics 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus. It requires a strong methodological differen-
tiation between a non-registered, “non-official”, “imported”, “dangerous”, and 
therefore “bad” Islam, on the one hand, and the “traditional” (home-grown) and 
“officially registered”, that is, “good” Islam, on the other. In the eyes of many 
observers, such a differentiation is an artificial enterprise; and in the post-Soviet 
reality accusations of being “non-traditional” can easily be used to indiscrimi-
nately repress not only all radical Salafi-minded groups (lumped together under 
the catch-all term “Wahhabi”) but also communities that have no clear political 
agenda, like the South Asian Tablighis and Turkish Muslim lay movements of 
the Nurcu and Gülen type. Iakupov often attacked all of these “foreign” trends in 
one breath.32 Against these foreign interpretations of Islam stands “traditional 
Tatar Islam” (traditsionnyi tatarskii islam), as the form of Islam that is 
traditional for the Tatars, conforming to their mentality – and that means, it is progressive; it 
was maintained over the millennia – and that means, it is true, correct, and the best that the 
Tatars can ever get.33
Only among the Tatars has the Prophetic Islam (prorocheskii islam) been preserved in its 
special purity, and therefore we [Tatars] are the carriers of the best [Islam], the owners of 
the special model.34
________________________________ 
otv. red. i sost. V. M. Iakupov. Kazan: Izdatel’stvo DUM RT, 2008; IAKUPOV, Valiulla: 
Imamy goroda Kazani. Kazan: Iman, 1429/2008; IAKUPOV: Izge Kazan beleshmä. Kazan:
Iman, 1426/2005; IAKUPOV: Tatarstan imam-khatïyblarï (shahädätnamäle (“ukazlï”) 
ruxaniyat). Kazan: Iman, 1426/ 2005; IAKUPOV: Möftilärebez. Kazan: Iman, 1425/2005.
30 YAGQUB, Väliulla xäzrät: Islam aslïna qaytu. Kazan: Iman, 2006; IAKUPOV, Valiulla: K
prorocheskomu islamu. Kazan: Iman, 2006; IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Islam segodnia. Kazan: 
Iman, 2011.
31 Interview with Rafik Mukhametshin by Alfrid K. Bustanov, Kazan, 18 January 2013.
32 IAKUPOV: K prorocheskomu islamu, pp. 346–407.
33 IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Mera islama (K problemu adekvatnogo konkretno-istoricheskogo 
ponimaniia vechnykh shariatskikh istin). Kazan: Iman, 1425/ 2004, p. 10.
34 IAKUPOV: Mera islama, p. 21. 
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Let us now briefly discuss a few issues that occupied a central place in Iaku-
pov’s “Tatar-Islamic” edifice. These are: (a) the place of Bulghar for the Islami-
zation of the Volga Tatars and the role of the Hanafi school of Islamic law 
(madhhab), (b) the struggle between the 19th- and early 20th-century Islamic mo-
dernists (Jadīdīs) and their “traditional” opponents, the so-called Qadīmīs, (c) 
the challenge of “Wahhabism” and the defense of Sufism, and (d) Islam-state 
relations in Russia. Debates on these issues unfolded against the background of a 
considerable fragmentation of the post-Soviet Islamic establishment, with Iaku-
pov’s Tatarstani Muftiate being located between the old (Imperial, Soviet and 
post-Soviet) Muslim Spiritual Administration in Ufa (since 1980 headed by 
Talgat Tadzhutdin) and the more recent Muftiate in Moscow (directed by 
Tadzhutdin’s former disciple – and now rival – Ravil’ Gainutdin). All of these 
Muftiates work under considerable political pressure from the republican and 
central authorities, and under close scrutiny by the media.35
5. Bulghar and Hanafism
The centerpiece of Iakupov’s distinct Tatar Islamic identity is the ancient city of 
Bulghar, south of Kazan. From Ibn Faḍlān’s Arabic travel report we know that 
the Bulghar rulers adhered to Islam already in the 10th century;36 in the 13th
century Bulghar was destroyed by the Mongols, and later on Kazan took over its 
functions as the Islamic center of the Volga-Urals. Still, local shrine catalogs and 
hagiographic narratives show that also in the 18th and 19th centuries the ruins of 
Bulghar were still an important place of Islamic pilgrimage; according to the 
legends expressed in these sources, it was the Prophet Muhammad himself who 
sent three of his companions (ṣaḥāba) to Bulghar, so that Islam in the Volga 
region goes back to the miracles of these saints and their descendants. This 
religious continuity is accompanied by the conviction that the Tatars of today are 
also genetically linked to the people of Bulghar. 
35 For overviews of the various Muftiates and the polemics among them, see SILANT’EV, Ro-
man A. (ed.): Islam v sovremennoi Rossii. Entsiklopediia. Moscow: 2008; and KEMPER: 
“Mufti Ravil Gainutdin: The Translation of Islam into a Language of Patriotism and Huma-
nism.” In: BUSTANOV / KEMPER (eds.): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language, pp. 
105–142. 
36 See, for instance, ZEKI, A.: Validi Togan, Ibn Fadlân´s Reisebericht. Abhandlungen der 
Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Bd. 24, 3; Leipzig: 1939, pp. 45ff.
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Valiulla Iakupov (under whose editorship the major work of the Bulghar 
hagiographic circle, the Tavārīkh-i bulghāriyya, was published in modern Tatar 
transcription)37  provided a straightforward defense of these hagiographies as 
historical reality. From a scientific viewpoint, this claim is untenable; as Allen 
Frank has shown, the Bulghar legends contain a significant amount of historical 
contradictions, and already in the second half of the 19th century Muslim scho-
lars of the Volga-Urals like Shihābaddīn al-Marjānī (d. 1889) (whose theological 
works were also republished under Iakupov’s directorship!) were mocking the 
many historical confusions in the Tavārīkh-i bulghāriyya.38 Still, for Iakupov the 
ṣaḥāba were of utmost importance to prove that Tatar Islam is not just a
derivation of another region’s Islam (e.g. of Central Asian origin), not imported 
at a later point but going back directly to the person of Muhammad. In one of his 
small publications for popular usage – in fact, a modern guide for Bulghar 
pilgrims –, Iakupov uses emotional arguments for the belief in the early Islami-
zation of Bulghar: he defends the importance of Bulghar’s shrines and towers as 
a “true relic” (podlinnaia relikviia) that fills the Tatar visitor with awe and 
awareness for his religious and ethnic roots. Such relics, he wrote, are very 
important in the era of science and technology. 39 The ṣaḥāba conversion 
narrative would provide an argument for the claim that Islam came to the Tatars 
before it got corrupted under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties in the Middle 
East. By contrast, in his more academic 2011 book Islam segodnia (“Islam 
Today”) Iakupov seems to realize that the ṣaḥāba stories are not convincing, and 
does not insist on their veracity; still, here too he uses the old age of Tatar Islam 
(testified by Ibn Faḍlān’s 922 report) to argue that Islam survived among the 
Tatars in its purest and most authentic form, before “Quranic Islam” (korani-
cheskii islam) was “strangled by the embrace of the hypocrite Arab tribal 
leadership”.40
Neither the ṣaḥāba legends nor the Ibn Faḍlān report explain the emergence 
of Hanafism among the Volga Muslims. For defending the Ḥanafī legal school 
37 MÖSLIMI: Tävarixï bolgariya (Bolgar tarixï), prepared for publication and annotated by 
Sälim Gïyläjetdinov, edited by V. Yagqubov. Kazan: Iman, 1999), 100 pp.
38 FRANK, Allen J.: Islamic Historiography and ‘Bulghar’ Identity among the Tatars and 
Bashkirs of Russia (Leiden, 1998). Interestingly, Iakupov served as one of the scientific 
editors of the Russian translation of Frank’s work that appeared in Kazan in 2008: Allen 
Frank, Islamskaia istoriografiia i “bulgarskaia” identichnost’ tatar i bashkir v Rossii.
Kazan: Rossiiskii islamskii universitet, 2008).  
39 IAKUPOV, Valiulla: Ziiarat [poseshchenie] sviatogo Bulgara. Kazan: Iman 1431/2010), p. 7. 
40 IAKUPOV, Islam segodnia, pp. 51–52; 95.
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as the correct choice of Russia’s Tatars, Iakupov therefore has to take recourse 
to intrinsic qualities that he ascribes to the Hanafi madhhab. 
Hanafism stands out as a liberal conception; it is precisely in Hanafism that preference is 
given to the method of ra’y (reflection) over the literalism of the other madhhabs; important 
is the principle of qiyās (analogy), which is again a purely rational mental instrument: an 
expression of the scientific approach that [Hanafism and Islam] also share with the 
humanities.41  
And: 
It is time to understand that the Islamic SCIENCES [sic], the shariat disciplines, are a 
scientific activity, with approaches that are equal to those in the humanities.42  
With other words, the defense of the Ḥanafiyya is based on its “liberalism” and 
its scientific methodology, its alleged philological approach to the Islamic 
sources. Religious and secular philological studies are united in this school. – 
What we observe here is that Iakupov’s translation of the Arabic terms ra’y and 
qiyās is largely correct, but that he takes their meanings out of the religious 
sphere and places them into a secular context, as “purely rational” methods. As 
Iakupov has it, the Tatar scholars have always been tolerant, “innovative” (nova-
torskie, a term that would smack of bid‘a from a Salafi viewpoint), and pro-
gressive.43 
6. Jadidism and Qadimism 
Generally, ra’y can mean a scholar’s use of his own preference when he has to 
choose between two possible solutions to a legal case in question; and this agen-
cy of the Ḥanafī scholar is often being regarded as a reflection of the customary 
law practice that was still largely in place in Abū Ḥanīfa’s (d. 767) lifetime (an 
issue that would not quite fit with Iakupov’s claim that the Ḥanafī Tatars were 
always very Sharia-minded). Qiyās is the use of analogy to find the unknown 
solution for one issue by comparing it with the known solution for a similar case. 
In this latter meaning qiyās (as one of the four pillars of Islamic law, according 
41  IAKUPOV: Tatarskoe “bogoiskatel’stvo” i prorocheskii islam. Kazan: Iman, 2003/ 1424, p. 7. 
42  IAKUPOV: Tatarskoe “bogoiskatel’stvo”, pp. 32–33. 
43  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 18. 
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to the consensus established after Shāfi‘ī [d. 820]) is largely identical with ijti-
hād. With the debate on ijtihād, however, Iakupov moves into another minefield, 
namely the dispute between the Jadīdīs and the Qadīmīs. 
In the Volga area, this discourse on the permissibility of ijtihād began in 
the early 19th century, when the Tatar scholar ‘Abdannaṣīr al-Qūrṣāwī (d. 1812) 
first formulated his defense of ijtihād in Islamic law and theology, as a critique 
of what he regarded as the corruption of Islam by unlawful human speculation 
(in the form of kalām). In the 1870s, the issue was again brought to the fore by 
Marjānī, who basically shared Qūrṣāwī’s points of view; and then in the follow-
ing decades by many Jadīdīs. Many conservative scholars opposed such a call 
for ijtihād, and Islamic reform in general; these scholars are often referred to as 
Qadīmīs, as “adherents of the old” (including traditional pedagogical methods).44 
Since the 1960s and 1970s, several historians in Soviet Tatarstan redis-
covered the Jadīdīs as a valuable part of the Tatar cultural heritage (“miras”). 
Marxist scholars like Iakh”ia Abdullin came up with a conceptual framework 
(which we, for the sake of simplicity, call “Mirasism”)45 in which the religious 
writings of some Tatar Islamic scholars and intellectuals (especially of the 
Jadīdīs and their two forerunners, Qūrṣāwī and Marjānī) could be seen, from a 
Marxist perspective, as expressions of a progressive development towards 
rationalism, secularism, and “democratic thinking”. By contrast, the so-called 
Qadīmīs were regarded as an expression of stagnation and backwardness, of 
“obscurantism” (especially if Sufis were involved) and the “blind following of 
the school masters”, that is, taqlīd. This dualism – good Jadīdīs versus bad 
Qadīmīs, investigative ijtihād versus dumb taqlīd – has remained popular ever 
since, with taqlīd being regarded as equivalent to a rejection of modernization in 
general; and there have only been few attempts to “rehabilitate” the Qadīmīs 
from their bad image.46 In the 1990s, one leading Tatar historian, Rafael’ Khaki-
44  For the debates around Qūrṣāwī and Marjānī see KEMPER, Michael: Sufis und Gelehrte in 
Tatarien und Baschkirien, 1789–1889: Der islamische Diskurs unter russischer Herrschaft. 
Berlin 1998; KEMPER, Michael: Sufii i uchenye v Tatarstane i Bashkortostane, 1789–1889: 
Islamskii diskurs pod russkim gospodstvom. Transl. by Iskander GILYAZOV. Kazan: Idel’-
Press, 2008.  
45  DUDOIGNON, Stéphane: “Djadidisme, mirasisme, islamisme.” Cahiers du Monde russe vol. 
XXXVI (1–2), 1996: 13–40; LAZZERINI, E.J.: “Tatarovedenie and the ‘New Historiography’ 
in the Soviet Union: Revising the Interpretation of the Tatar-Russian Relationship.” Slavic 
Review, 40, 4 (1981): 625–635. 
46  MUKHAMETSHIN, Rafik: Tatarskii traditsionalism: osobennosti i formy proiavleniia. Kazan, 
2005; DUDOIGNON, Stéphane: “La question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan russe, du 
‘premier renouveau’ à la soviétisation (fin du XVIIIe siècle–1937).” Cahiers du Monde 
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mov, even declared Tatar Jadidism to be a blueprint for a modern, liberal “Euro-
Islam”, which he tried to promote as the official Islam of Tatarstan’s Muslims.47
This black-and-white dichotomy must have been a dilemma to Iakupov; he 
rejected Khakimov’s Jadīdī “Euro-Islam” as the artificial brain-child of an aca-
demic politician,48 but to take, in response, only the Qadīmī heritage of the 
Tatars as the new model for “traditionalism” would smack of anti-intellec-
tualism. What we suggest here is that Iakupov found a very elegant solution to 
this problem: he regarded both the Jadīdīs and the Qadīmīs as valuable parts of 
the Tatar Islamic heritage. This is basically a dialectic approach: the acceptance 
that the two movements are just different sides of one and the same “pro-
gressive” trajectory. 
At the same time, Iakupov tried to soften the contradictions between the 
two. He thus claimed that even Shihābaddīn Marjānī had a strong affection for 
the site of Bulghar49 (not mentioning that Marjānī was a fervent critic of the 
Bulghar hagiographies and the ṣaḥāba narratives), and that Marjānī was also a 
staunch defender of the veracity of Hanafism50 (while his preference for ijtihād
actually challenged the strong madhhab boundaries). This attempt to unite oppo-
sites is also reflected in the publishing program of Iman, which comprised 
leading Jadīd thinkers (as well as Qūrṣāwī and Marjānī’s major theological 
works in which they called for ijtihād)51, but also Qadīmī literature directed 
against any reforms.52 This approach amounts to a clear attack on authors like 
________________________________ 
russe vol. XXXVI (1–2), 1996: 133–210. See also the recent monograph by FRANK, Allen J.:
Bukhara and the Muslims of Russia: Sufism, Education, and the Paradox of Islamic Prestige.
Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012. 
47 KHAKIM, Rafael’: Ternistyi put’ k svobode (Sochineniia. 1998–2007). Kazan: 2007, e.g. pp. 
276–284; KHAKIM, Rafael: Where is Our Mecca? (Manifest of Euroislam).
<http://www.kazanfed.ru/en/authors/khakimov/;
KHAKIM, R.: Dzhadidizm (reformirovannyi islam). Kazan: 2010.
48 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, pp. 30–31.
49 IAKUPOV: Ziiarat [poseshchenie] sviatogo Bulgara, p. 6.
50 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 18.
51 QURSAVI, Gabdennasïyr: Keshelärne tugrï yulga kündärü (Äl-irshad lil-gïybad) [al-Irshād 
lil-‘ibād]. Tatar translation from the Arabic by Zäynep MAQSUDOVA. Kazan: Iman, 1999; 
MÄRJANI, Shihabetdin xäzrätläre: Nazuratul xaq [Nāẓūrat al-haqq]. Translated from the 
Arabic by D. SHAIMURZIN, ed. by V. IAKUPOV. Kazan: Iman, 2001. Also Marjānī’s major 
historical works were edited in Russian translation. 
52 AL-KAZANI, Giladzhuddin ibn Mukhiddin as-Sardavi: Stal’noi klinok protiv novoi metodiki 
(Nusul al-khadida fi khiliafi al-usul al-dzhadida) [al-Nuṣūl al-ḥadīda fī khilāf al-uṣūl al-
jadīda]. Kazan: Iman, 2004.
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Iakh”ia Abdullin, who only regarded the pro-ijtihād Qūrṣāwī-Marjānī-Jadīdī line 
of thought as worthy of respect. Iakupov writes: 
People believe that Qūrṣāwī was more liberal than all the other scholars, for he emphasized 
the necessity of absolute ijtihād.53 But this is symptomatic nonsense, if you wish: a myth: 
the degree to which a scholar follows ijtihād is being regarded as a degree of liberalism. But 
why should ijtihād and liberalism be connected at all?54  
What we see here is that in Iakupov’s conception the Ḥanafī madhhab is by 
nature liberal because of its use of qiyās (= ijtihād), but that ijtihād becomes 
questionable when it leaves the accepted boundaries of the madhhab, for this 
would no longer be liberal. While arguing against the Mirasist simplifications, 
Iakupov still follows their major lines of reasoning; he accepts the generally 
positive, “liberal” character of qiyās/ijtihād, and just transfers it from the 19th-
century Jadīdīs to the Ḥanafī school in general. What “liberal” is supposed to 
mean remains vague; seemingly this concept is meant to express the idea of 
progress, tolerance, and lack of religious fanaticism – which are the core values 
of “Tatar traditionalism” in Iakupov’s vision. 
7. “Wahhabism” and Sufism 
Iakupov identified “Wahhabism” as a foreign element that was imported from 
abroad, especially from Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf states. In his polemic 
writings, he depicts Saudi-Arabia as a satellite of the United States; this brings 
together his fervent attacks on Salafism with his staunch critique of what he 
regards as Western materialism and Western global hegemony.55 
One very widespread way of debunking Salafism / “Wahhabism” in Russia 
is the accusation of “literalism”. Iakupov, too, uses this line of argumentation, 
and takes the issue of the localization of Allah as an example. The debate starts 
with the Quranic phrase thumma istawā ‘alā l-‘arsh,56 which can be translated as 
53  The concept of absolute ijtihād, ijtihād muṭlaq means that a scholar has the right to leave the 
framework of his madhhab if his ijtihād brought him to such a solution. In fact, Iakupov 
erred here, for Qūrṣāwī was no advocate of such an ijtihād muṭlaq, but continued to profess 
his adherence to the Ḥanafī school. 
54  IAKUPOV: Tatarskoe “bogoiskatel’stvo”, p. 24. 
55  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 251. 
56  Qur’an, 7:54; and variations of the same verse: 2:29; 10:3; 13:2; 20:5, 59; 32:4, 41:11, 57:4. 
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“and then [i.e., after the creation of Heaven and Earth,] [Allah] established 
Himself on the Throne”. Iakupov claims that the “Wahhabis” would take this 
Quranic verse as a proof for maintaining that Allah “sits down”, which would 
reveal their anthropomorphic interpretation of God. In response, Iakupov comes 
up with a very peculiar comparison: 
The phrase Allāh istawā must be translated as “Allah is above [Russian: prevyshe] the 
throne”, just like in the phrase “Deutschland über alles”, which means “Germany must be 
above everything else”, not in the sense of moving it onto something, for it is not in the 
Himalayas.57  
Such an argumentation, and this particular comparison, has of course nothing in 
common with the traditional Islamic methods of Quranic commentary (tafsīr); it 
rather reflects the author’s Marxist thinking and his Soviet higher education, 
coupled with a sense for provocation. Marxist patterns also appear in Iakupov’s 
frequent use of expressions like “objectively”, and “objective data”, and in a 
certain predilection for statistics. In some cases he even quotes Karl Marx and 
refers to the example of Lenin!58
In Iakupov’s writings, “Wahhabis” further appear as “sectarians” and ras-
kolniki (the latter term historically referring to the Russian Old Believers who 
refused to follow the mid-17th-century Orthodox Church reforms). And while the 
“Wahhabis” claim to be the adherents of pure monotheism, Iakupov accuses 
them of having introduced a “holy trinity” into Islam, namely that of Heaven, 
Throne, and “bodily God”;59 and in the “Wahhabi” aversion to shrine visits Iaku-
pov sees an Indian and Buddhist influence, in one article, or a borrowing from 
Zoroastrianism, on another occasion. 60 Similarly, according to Iakupov, the 
“Wahhabis” insist that any Islamic marriage (nikāḥ) be conducted in a mosque; 
this demand, so Iakupov, has no basis in the Islamic tradition and amounts to a 
“Christianization” of nikāḥ.61 Such allegations are of course meant to turn the 
“Wahhabi” claim of the purity of their Islamic message upside-down. Striking is 
also that these kinds of arguments were not uncommon in Soviet ethnographic 
literature, where scholars constantly attempted to single out “remnants of the 
pre-Islamic past” in the contemporary Islamic practice, and where Islam was 
57 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 16.
58 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 15; IAKUPOV, Mera Islama, p. 16.
59 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 254.
60 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 87; IAKUPOV, Anti-islam, p. 15.
61 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 264–265.
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largely understood as an eclectic mix of pre-existing elements.62 It is therefore 
perhaps not completely off the mark to argue that an important element of Iaku-
pov’s argumentation follows the epistemology of Soviet anti-religious ethno-
graphy. After all, Islamic and Soviet modes of thinking were not so very diffe-
rent, as Iakupov observed himself: 
The collective Soviet thinking, which was somehow close to the Muslim mentality, is [now] 
being washed away under the aggressive influence of Western civilization; and individualist, 
protestant ethics are being implanted [in its stead].63
Other important authorities of “traditional” Islam in the Russian Federation 
come from the camp of the Sufi brotherhoods; the most well-known representa-
tive of these was undoubtedly the Daghestani Shaykh Said-Afandi Chirkeevskii, 
who also became victim of Islamic terrorism in the same summer of 2012 
(though apparently independently from Iakupov’s murder).64 At least one work 
of Said-Afandi was also published by Iman, in Tatar translation. 65 Valiulla 
Iakupov’s relation to Sufism is indeed positive; still, he does not seem to have 
committed himself publicly to one ṭarīqa, or to one specific Sufi master. When 
discussing Sufism he recognized and respected the place of Said-Afandi’s com-
bined Naqshbandiyya / Shādhiliyya group in Daghestan, and the various Kunta-
Hajji branches of the Qādiriyya in Chechnya, but he did not argue for a revival 
of a specific ṭarīqa in Tatarstan.66 To be sure, Iakupov was very much in favor 
of restoring popular Sufi practices, including the shrine pilgrimage and collec-
tive Quran recitations (khatm), with the subsequent dedication (Tatar: baghïsh-
lau) of the spiritual award to the spirits of great ancestors and Sufi masters.67 But 
this is beyond the ṭarīqas, and more in the field of national custom: Iakupov 
emphasized that it was “the emotional specifics of the national character of the 
Tatars [which] made the Naqshbandiyya ṭarīqa so popular; this is so because 
62 DEWEESE, Devin: “Survival Strategies: Reflections on the Notion of Religious ‘Survivals’ 
in Soviet Ethnographic Studies of Muslim Religious Life in Central Asia.” In: MÜHLFRIED,
F. / S. SOKOLOVSKIY (eds.): Exploring the Edge of Empire: Soviet Era Anthropology in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia, 2011, pp. 35–58.
63 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 276 [italics added]. 
64 For Said-Afandi’s attack on the “Wahhabis” see KEMPER, M.: “The Discourse of Said-Afandi, 
Daghestan’s Foremost Sufi Master.” In: BUSTANOV / KEMPER (eds.): Islamic Authority and 
the Russian Language, pp. 167–218.
65 EL-CHIRKAVI, Säyed äfände: Bäräkätle belemnär khäzinäse. Kazan: Iman, 2006. 
66 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 29. 
67 Interview with Valiulla Iakupov by Alfrid K. Bustanov, Kazan, 30 March 2011. 
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this trend of Sufism prefers the ‘silent’ dhikr, which is carried out without move-
ments of the body, and it rejects the practice of singing like in a choir [during the 
ritual of the remembrance of Allah], and it stimulates the strict following of the 
shariat.”68 Needless to say, this reasoning – that Tatars are “quiet” by nature and 
therefore chose the “silent” form of commemoration, not the “loud” dhikr – 
amounts to a gross simplification of the complexity of Sufi practices and ignores 
the specific debates on the dhikr forms that were developed by Muslims in the 
Russian Empire since the 19th century.69 
8. Islam and the Russian State 
Another important component of Russia’s contemporary Islamic discourse is the 
“inter-faith dialogue” between the major Muftiates and, above all, the Russian 
Orthodox Church. In his later works Iakupov goes a long way to demonstrate 
that Tatar Islam and Russian Orthodoxy have always lived in peace, and that 
they have a lot in common; at one place he seems to indicate that Qūrṣāwī and 
the Jadīdīs might have been stimulated not by Islamic reformists from the 
Middle East but by thinkers of the Russian Orthodox Church who, in the 18th 
century, already emphasized the necessity of returning to the holy texts.70 He 
even finds that the notorious Russian Orthodox missionaries of the Kazan Spi-
ritual Academy at times made valuable contributions to the study of the Tatars. 
This discourse on Islamic-Orthodox relations is embedded in a broader 
profession of loyalty towards the Russian state. Iakupov argues that Islam is 
completely depending on state support: in his view the Sharia is “etatist” in 
nature, meaning that it always needs a state to support it. As Islam has no 
church, the role of the church used to be played by the state, either directly or via 
special institutions like the Muftiates that began to be established in Tsarist 
Russia under Catherine the Great. 
68  IAKUPOV: Tatarskoe “bogoiskatel’stvo”, pp. 20–21. 
69  For Central Asia, see BABADZHANOV, B.M. / S.A. MUKHAMMADAMINOV: Sobranie fetv po 
obosnovaniiu zikra dzhakhra i sama’. Almaty; Tashkent: Daik Press, 2008; for the North 
Caucasus, see KEMPER, M.: “Khālidiyya Networks in Daghestan and the Question of Jihād.” 
Die Welt des Islams 42, 1 (2002): 41–71; for Tatarstan, KEMPER: Sufis und Gelehrte, pp. 82–
124 passim. 
70  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 16. 
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Islam, since its very appearance, has been formed as a state religion; accordingly, Islam 
cannot stay remote from the state but to the contrary, our religion can only exist fully in 
close cooperation with the state.71  
Iakupov is not openly suggesting that the Russian Federation should accept 
Islam as a state religion; but the state is admonished to accept its responsibility 
for the development of Islam. Without state intervention, so Iakupov, Russia’s 
Islamic scene is not capable of bringing its own affairs in order.72 The state 
should support Islamic education (e.g. by giving accreditation to Arabic / Islamic 
courses at schools) and prevent “Wahhabi” takeovers: in fact, according to Iaku-
pov, several Muftiates – especially in Siberia – “serve the interests of Russia’s 
geopolitical enemies”, and their leaders must be replaced by “patriotic clergy”.73 
For a representative of Islam, these statements are rather straightforward. The 
goal is to create an attractive “Russian-Federation-Islam” (rossiiskii islam) 
which will embody Islam “in secular forms”.74 At many occasions, Iakupov 
implies that this requires the end of the divisions between the various Muslim 
organizations in Russia, a unification of the sixty-odd Muftiates in the Russian 
Federation. With this vision, Iakupov seems to suggest that the state should 
create an Islamic equivalent to the highly hierarchical Russian Orthodox Church, 
perhaps with a “Muslim Patriarch” on top of the pyramid. 
9. Valiulla Iakupov’s “Russian Islamic Language” 
Our brief overview of Iakupov’s major lines of argumentation already revealed 
numerous examples for the terminology and style that the author employed in 
his programmatic texts. In this last section we would like to look at Iakupov’s 
writings from a linguistic perspective, by using a model that we explored in 
2012 with a number of Russian-language texts written by other Islamic autho-
rities.  
In that experiment we selected the writings of several Muftis, preachers and 
Islamic intellectuals and tried to find out whether one can speak of the 
emergence of a common “Islamic Russian”, that is, of a specific sociolect that all 
71  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 27. 
72  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, pp. 19–22. 
73  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 272. 
74  IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 54. 
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participants in the contemporary discourse of Islam in Russia share. We paid 
particular attention to the introduction of Arabic / Islamic loan words into the 
Russian language, to the use of Russian religious terms that originate from the 
context of the Russian Orthodox Church, and to the use of Western sociological 
terminology. Roughly speaking, our case studies revealed that contemporary 
“Islamo-Russian” comprises at least three “variants”, or styles: one style we 
label “Arabism” (because it is characterized by the massive use of Arabic 
loanwords without Russian translation), the second style we suggest to call 
“Russianism” (because its adherents attempt to avoid Arabic loanwords for 
Islamic terms, and search for Russian religious equivalents instead), and the 
third variant we described as “Academism” (because it contains significant 
secular Marxist or Western academic repertoires). Important to note is that each 
of these three “variants” of Islamic Russian is used not by one single camp of the 
broad Islamic spectrum in Russia but by several of them, in fact: by competitors 
and enemy pairs. Thus Sufis and Salafis alike tend to use huge amounts of 
Arabisms; Russia’s competing Muftis tend to use the “Russianism” variant 
(avoiding Arabisms and appropriating existing Russian terms instead); and the 
sociological parlance of “Academism” is especially widespread among intellec-
tual projects of Islam, including not only Tatar “Mirasism”/“Euro-Islam” (as 
mentioned above) but also a number of Russian converts to Islam who attack 
each other on the question whether ultra-orthodox Sunnism or radical Shiism 
will eventually save Russia. Finally, we observed that some Islamic authors de-
velop techniques of code-switching in order to reach out to different audiences 
and readers.75 Where on this spectrum would we have to locate the “style” of 
Valiulla Iakupov?  
There are many instances where Iakupov appropriated Russian terms of Church 
Slavonic provenance for Islamic meanings, as for example when he uses the 
“Islamic credo” (islamskoe kredo) in parallel to the Arabic term ‘aqīda. But a 
larger part of Iakupov’s “Russianisms” seems to have roots in the Soviet 
discourse of Islam, in the “administrative” language of the Council for Religious 
Affairs (many items of which have by now become almost standard usage). Thus 
Iakupov constantly refers to the religious leaders of Islam as “servants of the 
cult” (sluzhiteli kul’ta, sviashchennosluzhiteli), or as “clergy” (dukhovenstvo);
75 BUSTANOV / KEMPER (eds.): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language; KEMPER M. / A. 
BUSTANOV: “Islam i russkii iazyk: sotsiolingvisticheskie aspekty stanovleniia obshche-
rossiiskogo islamskogo diskursa.” In: Kazanksoe islamovedenie 2013 (1), forthcoming.
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and the religious practice itself is the “religious cult”.76 The same Soviet con-
nection is obvious in his reflections on “Muslim sectarianism” (musul’manskoe 
sektanstvo), “heresies” (eresy), “split-off sects” (raskol’nicheskie sekty), “cult-
related buildings” (kul’tovye zdaniia), and “core community of the mosques” 
(aktivy pri mechetiakh). This whole set of terminology was characteristic for the 
official documents and statements of the Soviet Muftiates and the state organs 
that directed them; what characterizes this pool of terms is that it emphasizes not 
religion (the religious dogma, or the religious practice and experience) but, in a 
very dry form, the administration and control of religion by state bodies.77 The 
same language could also be found in the Soviet anti-religious literature.78 Iaku-
pov’s borrowings might not be a coincidence: and as one of his co-workers men-
tioned in an interview, in the Perestroika years Russia’s Muslims turned to athe-
istic and anti-religious literature to obtain basic information on their religion.79
Other Russian terms in Iakupov’s personal discourse can be understood as a 
form of “Christianizing” Islamic concepts; and these are often cases where one 
would have expected a strong Tatar influence, and thus Tatar Islamic loanwords 
of Arabic origin. We find these elements in phrases like “from the arsenal of 
God-service the Tatars pay special attention to the dua [du‘ā], which they create 
both individually and in congregation” (iz arsenala bogopoklonenii tatary 
vydeliaiut dua, kotoroe tvoriat kak individual’no, tak i soborno); here both 
bogopoklonenie (lit. “bowing to God”) and soborno (“in congregation”) appear 
as obvious borrowings from Russian Orthodox parlance.80 As we see here, the 
prayer (molitva) is not “done” or “read”, as other authors of Tatar provenance 
would have it,81 but “created” (from Russian tvorit’), which speaks of a Christian 
origin (there is no analogy in the Islamic terminology). Note also that Iakupov’s 
form dua (“invocation of Allah”) is closer to the academic transliteration (which 
would be du‘ā) than to the Tatar vernacular form (doga). And terms derived 
76 IAKUPOV: Islam v Tatarstane, pp. 4, 6, 26; IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 4.
77 For the terminology of Soviet Islamic Russian see in particular KEMPER, M. / Sh. SHIKHA-
LIEV: “Administrative Islam: Two Soviet Fatwas from the North Caucasus.” In: BUSTANOV /
KEMPER (eds.): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language, pp. 55–102.
78 For example Populiarnye lektsii po ateizmu (Moscow, 1962), pp. 250–274.
79 Interview with Nail’ Garipov by Alfrid K. Bustanov, Kazan, 14 January 2013.
80 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 29. Cf. his usage of tvorit’ namaz on p. 34.
81 For example: BUSTANOV, A.: “Rafail’ Valishin’s ‘Anti-Wahhabi’ Sufi Traditionalism.” In:
BUSTANOV / KEMPER (eds.): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language, p. 255. Still, 
Iakupov uses the Tatar variant of “to read namaz” in other publications: IAKUPOV: Islam v 
Tatarstane, p. 32; IAKUPOV: Mera islama, p. 4.
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from (or related to) the Russian sobor [“cathedral”] have already become main-
stream in Russian Islamic texts; thus also Iakupov would speak of the sobornaia 
mechet’, in place of the Arabic dzhuma [jum‘a] mechet’. The postulate of the 
“communal character” (sobornost’) of Islam, this “true collectivism”82 (again 
possibly derived from a Marxist framework) in Valiulla Iakupov’s narrative 
underlines that there is only one correct way of practicing Islam (which would 
exclude the Salafis who perform the prayer in a slightly different manner, by 
raising their hands more than once).83
In his attempt to find appropriate Russian terms (also in compounds like 
“Islamic Orthodoxy” [islamskaia ortodoksiia] and “commonly accepted Sharia” 
[obshchepriznannyi shariat]),84 Iakupov comes close to the style of the well-
known Moscow imam Shamil’ Aliautdinov (b. 1974), who in his sermons also 
refers to the “canons (kanony) of Islam”, and who in his writings says he offers 
the “canonically” approved theological decisions.85 Taken from a Christian con-
text, these expressions are obviously meant to replace terms from the word field 
of Arabic ijmā‘, i.e. the “consensus” of the Muslim scholars on a certain issue. 
The effect of using “canonical” instead of “consensus” is of course that the legal 
decision in question is being presented as an inflexible law, as the only “correct” 
way of Islam for all times (whereas “consensus” would emphasize the open 
negotiation act). For both authors, such linguistic choices are pretty natural: just 
like Shamil’ Aliautdinov explains that his translation of the meaning of the 
Quran is above all addressing readers who formulate their thoughts in the 
Russian language,86 so also Valiulla Iakupov uses Christian analogies in order to 
make Islamic problems understandable “for a reader educated in a Christiano-
centric educational space (v khristianotsentrichnom obrazovatel’nom prostranst-
ve)”.87 Both authors also have no problems in referring to non-Islamic authors, 
including the classics of Russian literature (e.g. Chekhov and Tolstoi in the 
writings of Aliautdinov, Saltykov-Shchedrin for Iakupov) and European socio-
82 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 29
83 In the original bestolkovoe mel’teshenie nenuzhnykh dopolnitel’nykh zhestov; IAKUPOV:
Anti-islam, p. 30.
84 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 6; IAKUPOV: Islam v Tatarstane, p. 33.
85 BUSTANOV, A.: “Beyond the Ethnic Traditions: Shamil’ Aliautdinov’s Muslim Guide to 
Success.” In: BUSTANOV / KEMPER (eds): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language, p. 
150.
86 See the subtitle for his book: ALIAUTDINOV, Sh.: Sviashchennyi Koran: Smysly. Bogoslovskii 
perevod. St Petersburg: Dilia, 2012.
87 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 22.
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logists. But while both authors use the same linguistic instruments, they maintain 
very different views; Aliautdinov repeatedly rejected the idea of a special “Tatar 
Islam” that was so dear to Iakupov, and its claim to veracity; while Iakupov, 
when we asked him whether he would count the energetic Aliautdinov among 
the leaders of the Muslims in the Russian Federation, gave a negative reply.88 
This of course confirms our observation, mentioned above, that pairs of 
opponents within the Islamic discourse often employ similar linguistic instru-
ments and techniques, in order to reach out not only to their followers but also to 
their adversaries. In fact, the joint use of a given Islamo-Russian style or variant 
seems to keep the overall Islamic discourse together.89 
10. Code-switching to “Arabism” 
While Iakupov thus put much emphasis on the translation of Islamic terms into 
Russian (e.g. etot mir for Arabic dunyā, “this world”; zapretnoe and dozvolen-
noe for ḥarām and ḥalāl),90 in some of his writings we also find passages where 
ample use is being made of loanwords, like for instance in the following defense 
of the madhhab system, and of the Ḥanafiyya in particular: 
For this reason there is the important and topical task that we have to fulfil, namely that 
when ḥadīths and ḥukms of a madhhab are in contradiction, we follow the ḥukms of the 
imāms of the fiqh, because there is the danger of falling into the sin [Russian grekh!] of 
following an abrogated ḥadīth, even more so as Abū Ḥanīfa, being a [representative of the] 
ṭābi‘īn, operated exclusively [with ḥadīth material] from the reliable sunna.91 
Such passages with many untranslated Arabic loan words might result from 
insufficient editorial work; and indeed, some brochures of Iakupov’s production 
remind us of the “wild” popular Islamic samizdat publications of certain village 
88  Interview with Valiulla Iakupov by Alfrid K. Bustanov, Kazan, 30 March 2011. 
89  KEMPER: “Comparative Conclusion: ‘Islamic Russian’ as a New Sociolect?” In: BUSTANOV / 
KEMPER (eds.): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language, pp. 403–416. 
90  IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 9. 
91  IAKUPOV: Mera islama, p. 41. Original: «Поэтому так важна и актуальна для нас задача 
при противоречии хадисов и хукмов мазхаба, следовать хукмам имамов фикха, т.к. 
есть опасность впадения в грех следования отмененному хадису, тем более, что Абу 
Ханифа, будучи табигином, оперировал исключительно достоверной сунной». Note 
that here the Arabic letter ‘ayn is rendered in a Tatar form, as [g]. 
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preachers (as for instance the Siberian Tatar Rafail’ Valishin (1956–2012) 
whose style we analysed elsewhere).92 Probably the omission of Russian equi-
valents or explanations occurred rather automatically, in a style close to the spo-
ken form of “Islamo-Russian” that comes naturally in disputes and conversations 
among specialists. Seemingly the author expected that his readers were already 
sufficiently acquainted with the Islamic vocabulary so that Russian synomyms 
for ḥukm (“judgment”), sunna and ḥadīth, but also for ṭābi‘īn (“successor of the 
successors of the Prophet”) were not necessary if the author wrote this passage 
for “insiders”. In addition, “Arabism”, as the massive use / creation of Arabic 
loanwords for concepts that could also be expressed through Russian equi-
valents, might also serve the purpose to demonstrate the author’s good know-
ledge of Arabic and Islam, and to elevate his scholarly status in the eyes of the 
readers. What is interesting in the quote above is that between all these Ara-
bisms, Iakupov still used a Christian Orthodox concept, namely the term grekh
“sin”. This text passage thus provides a good example for code-switching, from 
the dominant style “Russianism” to “Arabism” and back.
11. Arabic-Russian Fusions
Next to “Russianisms” and “Arabisms”, Iakupov also frequently uses what one 
might regard as modern media terminology, e.g. when he refers to the current 
Arab Spring as a pereformatirovanie (“re-formatting”) of the Arabic World.93
More striking are neologisms and new phrases that he creates on the basis of 
words of Arabic and Russian/European origins. Thus we find rather innovative 
word connections like tsikl namaza (in the sense of “performance of all parts of 
one particular prayer”), rabstvo khadisovedeniia (“the servitude to the ḥadīth
sciences”, a critique of the Wahhabis’ obsession with ḥadīth), vakhkhabitskii 
kholding (“Wahhabi holding”, the idea that Wahhabis set up huge networks not 
only in the religious sphere but also in economy and politics), koranicheskie 
medzhlisy (“private gatherings of Muslims for reading the Quran”),94 revaivali-
zatsiia islama (“Islamic revivalism”), prorocheskii islam (“Prophetic Islam”), 
92 BUSTANOV: “Rafail’ Valishin’s “Anti-Wahhabi” Sufi Traditionalism,” p. 235.
93 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 54.
94 YAGQUB, Valiulla: Märxümnärgä yardäm itü turïnda. Kazan: Iman, 1426/ 2005, p. 15;
IAKUPOV: O pomoshchi dusham umershikh. Kazan: Iman, 1426/ 2005), p. 16.
834 ALFRID K. BUSTANOV AND MICHAEL KEMPER
AS/EA LXVII•3•2013, S. 809–835 
ramochnaia shariatskaia norma (“Sharī‘a framework”)95, arsenal bogopoklo-
nenii (“forms of divine service”), fikkhicheskii pliuralizm (“pluralism in Islamic 
law”) and pravovernyi khanafitskii mazkhabicheskii islam (“Orthodox Ḥanafī 
Madhhabī Islam”).96 A striking case of creatively mixing church repertoires with 
Western sociology language is also primordial’naia grekhovnost’ (“the concept 
of the primordial / eternal sin”), which Iakupov ascribed to the “Wahhabis”.97
These neologisms serve multiple functions in Valiulla Iakupov’s narratives. 
On the one hand, they clearly demonstrate Iakupov’s desire to fit Islamic pheno-
mena into the framework of Western social sciences. In fact, he is bringing 
Arabic words into the Russian academic framework, turning, for example, the 
concept of legal pluralism (which usually refers to the co-existence of several 
legal systems in one particular community) into what he calls fiqh pluralism 
(fikkhicheskii pliuralizm, meaning the mutual recognition of the four Sunni 
madhhabs). On the other hand, as a well-educated author with a solid grounding 
in Russian classics, Iakupov tried to create colourful labels for the topics in 
question, to formulate short and clear designations for complex social pheno-
mena. 
12. Conclusion:
Form and Content in Iakupov’s Programmatic Writings
Valiulla Iakupov’s style of writing on Islamic topics was diverse and not without 
contradictions. Thus while Iakupov strove to protect Tatar culture and the use of 
the Tatar language in the mosques, his own texts are full of borrowings from 
Christian terminology, and his target audience is, to a large degree, Russian-
speaking and Soviet-educated. Iakupov regularly used Arabic words, but he con-
verted them into an academic jargon that is close to media language. This diver-
sity in style can be explained by the author’s attempt to reach out to several 
audiences. First of all, Iakupov appealed to the state, demanding support and 
direct state intervention against the “foreign threats”. Accordingly, some of 
Iakupov’s texts are full of administrative vocabulary that is very familiar to state 
officials, and of religious “Russianisms” that are close to Church officials. 
Second, as a member of the Tatar scholarly community, Iakupov also targeted 
95 IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 29.
96 IAKUPOV: Mera islama, p. 41.
97 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 279.
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academic circles in Kazan, whether secular, religious, or mixed. Finally, another 
strategy presupposed the usage of the oversimplified “bad Islam / good Islam” 
dichotomy: while defining and defending Tatar “traditional” Islam, Valiulla 
Iakupov was forced to express himself in terms clear not only to the Salafis (who 
share the black-and-white perspective) but also to the broader public that de-
mands clear-cut answers to complex questions, and that is not willing to engage 
in a discussion of nuances. 
A key for understanding these linguistic and discursive complexities is that 
Iakupov shared specific discursive techniques with those whom he attacked in 
his writings. In our article, we observed this with the examples of “Mirasism” 
(which Iakupov attacked for their simplifications, but whose simplifications he 
also appropriated when it was useful, as seen in the issue of “liberalism” and 
ijtihād), of “Wahhabism” (whose obsession with Islamic purity he adopts by 
turning it against them), and finally in the comparison with Moscow Imam 
Aliautdinov, whose style of rendering Islamic concepts in Russian is very close 
to that of Iakupov, although Aliautdinov, as a universalist, feels no sympathies 
for a “national” brand of Islam.
Interestingly, when Iakupov creatively appropriated and adapted terms 
from a Christian context, he did that in full awareness. As he noted in the context 
of his employment of the words “church” and “clergy” in Islamic contexts, 
“when using the Russian language we are forced to use a number of terms that 
obtain some special nuanced meanings when used with respect to Islam; they 
should not be read in the Orthodox meaning.” 98 What we see here is that 
Iakupov fully realized the implications of his language use. Furthermore, he also 
reflected upon the language strategies of his opponents, the “Wahhabis”, and 
pointed out that their preference for the Russian language leads to a gradual 
Russification of Russia’s Muslims; the “Salafitization” of the youth comes via 
enforcing the use of the Russian language in the mosques.99 What Iakupov does 
not fully spell out here – but what he must have realized as well – is that also he 
himself made a significant contribution to the development and propagation of 
the new Russian Islamic language. 
98 IAKUPOV: Islam segodnia, p. 20.
99 IAKUPOV: Mera islama, p. 4; IAKUPOV: Anti-islam, p. 34.
